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With this issue, Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics intends to offer homage to John Randolph 
Lucas, one of the most significant contemporary philosophers, by presenting the debate about 
Mechanism raised in the second half of the Nineteenth Century as a consequence of some very 
relevant articles proposed by Lucas. Lucas suggested for the first time in “Minds, Machines, 
and Gödel” - an article published in Philosophy, XXXVI during 1961 - the possibility of 
proving the fallacy of any Mechanist position, by showing the existence, for every machine, of 
a true sentence recognizable by human beings but not by the machine itself: this article was 
followed by many replies and it has therefore produced interesting disputes between Lucas 
himself and other philosophers. 
Every article proposed in this issue has been already published in other reviews: with regard 
to this we would like, first of all, to thank authors and reviews that have given us the 
authorization to reproduce such articles, in particular the British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science and I. J. Good for Human and Machine Logic, The Monist and P. Benacerraf for God, 
the Devil, and Gödel, Philosophia and A. Hutton for This Gödel is killing me, Philosophy and 
D. Coder for Gödel’s Theorem and Mechanism, and again Philosophy and D. Lewis for Lucas 
against Mechanism. As underlined, this presentation does not aim to propose new papers but 
to make previously published papers more easily accessible by means of a unitary issue. 
Moreover we present a recent interview with Lucas, whereby we try to clarify some interesting 
but controversial questions concerning the use of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem against 
Mechanism; with reference to this interview, we would like to conclude whit a particular 
thanks to Lucas himself for his kindness and for his permission to reproduce the articles here 
presented.  
My own thanks to those who have given me the possibility of contributing to this project: in 
particular Pierpaolo Marrone who offered me the opportunity of writing for Etica & Politica / 
Ethics & Politics, Diego Marconi for his organization of my PhD course, and Michele Di 
Francesco, Paolo Casalegno and Piergiorgio Odifreddi who helped me during the study of this 
subject. 
 
 
The nineteenth century sees a revival of the debate about the possibility of analysing the human 
mind’s operations with the models of Mechanicism and, thanks to the evolution of computing 
science, of interpreting human thought by means of the analogy with particular kinds of 
software. In the attempt to contrast these aims, very different arguments have been used; the 
most interesting ones have been developed thanks to the significant results of contemporary 
logics. 
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In this context we can find a good number of remarkable and important articles written by 
Professor John Randolph Lucas: in his opinion it is possible to find interesting answers to 
ethical problems – such as the impossibility of reducing the human mind to a sort of 
computer’s program – and also to different subjects such as mathematics and logics. He tries 
indeed to maintain the difference between human thought and computers’ work by means of 
the Incompleteness Theorem, one of the most important results of contemporary logics, 
demonstrated by Kurt Gödel in 1931 and presented in ‘Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze per 
Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I’(1). 
In the Lucas's opinion, there is at least one sentence whose truth a rational human being can see 
and a computer is on the other hand incapable of finding and such a fact can be pointed out by 
means of the Gödel’s first theorem: this theorem proves – for every formal system consistent 
and powerful enough – the existence of a formula that can be expressed in the system and 
recognised as true by human beings, but that can’t be demonstrated by the system itself. 
Considering that a computer is constituted by nothing else than an implementation of a formal 
system by a physical machine and that the work of every machine can be expressed by a formal 
system, it is possible to maintain – in Lucas's view – that for every computer and, in general, 
for every machine there is a sentence that can be formulated by the language of that computer 
or machine but that can’t be proved by it: at the same time we can see the truth of this sentence 
by following the argument outlined by Gödel in his theorem. If, for every machine, a sentence 
exists about which we (human beings) can state something that the machine can’t, it is possible 
to conclude that no machine and no computer can be able to reproduce human thought and 
therefore that human thought is something different from the work of any machine or 
computer. 
A formal demonstration of the Incompleteness Theorem is far too complicated and technical 
for this context, but we can try to understand the general method of its development by means 
of an informal argument that can be compared whit that theorem: the liar’s paradox. Lets 
suppose that someone states ‘What I am asserting is false’: if what he’s saying is really false, it 
is false that what he is saying is false and so what he’s asserting is true; on the other hand, if 
what he’s asserting is true, it is true that what he’s saying is false; in any case the statement 
produces a contradictory conclusion. The contradiction is due to the fact that the statement is 
auto-referencial: one of the most interesting aspects of the argument developed by Gödel 
consists in reproducing an argument from a point of view which is very similar to this one, 
although he substitutes the concept of ‘truth’ with the concept of ‘provability’. As for the 
possibility of expressing meta-mathematical assertions inside arithmetic itself, Gödel creates an 
arithmetical sentence asserting its non-provability within the system (lets call it ‘gödelian 
sentence’ of the system); the demonstration of the non-provability of this sentence is carried 
out with logical instruments, thus proving that if this sentence can be demonstrated inside the 
system the system itself is not consistent (2), however the truth of the sentence - that can’t be 
proved in the system as it is showed by the demonstration just mentioned - is intuitively 
derivable: the sentence asserts indeed its own non-provability and, because its not-provable, is 
exactly what it has already verified: if a human being can understand such a demonstration he 
can also recognise the truth of the sentence.  
Therefore, according to Lucas, for every formal system - and for every possible machine (since 
a machine is nothing else than the concrete realisation of a formal system) - we can find a 
sentence not provable inside the system (and therefore not provable by the corresponding 
machine), but whose truth we are able to recognise if we use the argument conceived by Gödel. 
In Lucas opinion such a use of Gödel’s first theorem can represent a good argument against the 
attempts of maintaining a Mechanist position: Lucas does not intend to suggest that his 
argument must to be interpreted as a complete and invincible demonstration against every form 
of Mechanism, but that it can be a good scheme of argument against those who maintain the 
truth of Mechanism. Mechanism, in all of its various forms, affirms that there is a machine at 
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least capable of reproducing what human beings are able of doing with their reasoning: 
nevertheless human beings are in principle able of recognising the truth of the gödelian 
sentence for any formal system and therefore they are able of recognising the truth of the 
gödelian sentence for any machine, truth that the corresponding formal systems and machines 
cannot reach. Therefore, for every machine, we can identify a sentence whose truth we are able 
of recognising but that the machine itself cannot recognise, thus – for every machine – there is 
a task that a human being can do, at least in principle, but that a machine cannot: for this reason 
we can maintain that, if for any machine there is a task impossible for it but possible for a 
human being, human thought cannot be reduced to the operations of a machine and therefore 
Mechanism is wrong.  
In reply to the defenders of Mechanism, who suggest that for every machine M there is a 
machine more powerful than M capable of proving the gödelian sentence for M, Lucas 
responds that also for this new machine there is a sentence – the goedelian sentence for this 
new machine – that can be recognised as true by human reasoning but not by the machine 
itself, and so for any more and more powerful machines, capable of demonstrating the gödelian 
sentence for less powerful machines but not for themselves. On the other hand, a representative 
of Mechanism could suggest that neither machines nor human beings are capable of seeing the 
truth of the goedelian sentence for the most interesting formal systems and related machines, 
because this truth depends on their consistency and on another important theorem - Gödel’s 
second theorem - which shows that for every formal system, powerful and consistent enough, it 
is not possible to prove its consistency within the system itself. Therefore, for systems of this 
kind, we can only suppose that their goedelian sentence is true but we can never confirm this 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, in Lucas opinion, it is not correct to maintain that - in general - we 
are not able of proving the consistency of a formal system: the only requirement of Gödel’s 
second theorem is that such a consistency can’t be demonstrated within the system itself, not 
that it can’t be formally demonstrated in any way. A convincing proof of Peano's arithmetic – 
for instance – is formulated by Gentzen by using transfinite induction: thanks to Gödel’s 
second theorem we know that we can’t prove the consistency of Peano's arithmetic by means 
of its axioms and rules, but such a theorem does not prevent us from obtaining a demonstration 
of consistency for this systems by applying to principles external to the system itself. 
Moreover, although Gödel’s second theorem shows that we cannot demonstrate the 
consistency of a formal system within that same formal system, we can in many cases argue for 
its consistency by means of wider and more general considerations (if we really suppose that 
formal systems expressing mathematics and arithmetic are inconsistent, we must indeed 
abandon not only these fields but also all the scientific subjects correlated to them, that is the 
great majority of our scientific knowledge). 
In Lucas's opinion, from the a. m. analysis of Goedel’s Incompleteness Theorem we obtain a 
new and powerful tool against Mechanism: the importance and peculiarity of the argument 
suggested by Lucas consist in developing from the analysis of rational mental faculties, that is 
mathematical operations, a characteristic that differentiates Lucas’s proposal from the already 
diffused arguments against Mechanism that refer to other human ability such as fantasy, 
creativity, artistic ability and so on, hardly reducible to some formal and mechanic process. 
 
 
 
 
Note 
 
(*) For the copyright of the papers of J.R. Lucas see http://users.ox.ac.uk/~jrlucas/ back 
(1) K. Gödel, Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze per Principia Mathematica und verwandter 
Systeme I , in ‘Monatshefte für Mathematik und Phisyk’, 38, 1931. back 
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(2) Lets imagine an arithmetical formula G representing the meta-mathematical sentence ‘G is 
not provable’: by means of the possibility of expressing meta-mathematical expressions in 
arithmetical terms, such a formula can correspond to a fixed number h and be equivalent to the 
sentence ‘the formula associated to h is not provable’; it is possible to prove that G is 
demonstrable if and only if ~G is demonstrable. We can take a formula ~Dim(x,y), 
representing the meta-mathematical sentence ‘the formulas’ sequence associated to x is not a 
demonstration for the formula associated to z’ (where x and z are numbers); we obtain, by 
adding (x) – that means ‘for every x’ – at the beginning of this formula, a new formula 
(x)~Dim(x,z), corresponding to the sentence ‘for every x, the formulas’ sequence associated to 
x is not a proof of the formula associated to z’, that is ‘the formula associated to z is not 
provable’. Lets consider (x)~Dim[x,sost(y,13,y)], representing ‘the formula associated to the 
number sost(y,13,y) is not provable’, where sost(y,13,y) means ‘the number of the formula 
obtained from the formula associated to y by substituting the variable associated to 13 whit the 
number corresponding to y’. We can suppose that the number associated to 
(x)~Dim[x,sost(y,13,y)] is n: lets substitute, in this formula, the variable corresponding to 13 - 
that is y - with n; we obtain a new formula (x)~Dim[x,sost(n,13,n)], that we may call G. The 
number corresponding to this formula is sost(n,13,n): for G means ‘the formula associated to 
sost(n,13,n) is not provable’, (x)~Dim[x,sost(n,13,n)] represents the meta-mathematical 
sentence ‘(x)~Dim[x,sost(n,13,n)] is not provable’. We obtain in this way a formula G 
asserting its non-provability: G is not formally provable, otherwise its negation – that is 
~(x)~Dim[x,sost(n,13,n)] – would be equally provable, and so it is true. In fact, if G was 
provable, there would be a formulas’ sequence proving G within arithmetic: lets imagine a 
number k corresponding to such a proof. The arithmetical relation Dim(x,z) would have to link 
k and sost(n,13,n), so Dim[k,sost(n.13,n)] would have to be not only true but also formally 
provable and from this formula we could deduce – by logic’s transformational rules - 
~(x)~Dim[x,sost(n,13,n)]. back 
 
